Introduction
Information assurance (IA) refers to methodologies to protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. In collaborative design, IA is mission-critical. Suppose a team of designers is working collaboratively on a 3D assembly model. Each designer has a different set of security privileges and no one on the team has the "need to know" the details of the entire design. In collaboration, designers must interface with others' components/assemblies, but do so in a way that provides each designer with only the level of information he or she is permitted to have about each of the components. For example, one may need to know the 1 INTRODUCTION Drexel University Technical Report DU-CS-04-01, January 2004 exact shape of some portion of the part (including mating features) being created by another designer, but not the specifics of any other aspects of the part. Such a need can also be found when manufacturers outsource designing a sub-system: manufacturers may want to hide some critical information of the entire system from suppliers.
The authors believe that a geometric approach to IA represents a new problem that needs to be addressed in the development of collaborative CAD systems. The approach we develop has many uses visible across several significant scenarios we envision for applying this work:
Protection of sensitive design information: As noted above, designers may have "need to know" rights based on legal, intellectual property, or national security requirements.
Collaborative supply chains: Engineering enterprises outsource a considerable amount of design and manufacturing activity. In many situations, the organization needs to provide vital design data to one partner while protecting the intellectual property of another partner.
Multi-disciplinary design:
For designers of different disciplines working on common design models, designers suffer from cognitive distraction when they must interact with unnecessary design details that they do not understand and cannot change. For example, an aircraft wheel well [Callahan and Heisserman, 1996 ] is a complex and confusing place in which electronics, mechanical, and hydraulics engineers all must interact in close quarters with vast amounts of detailed design data. These interactions could be made more efficient if the design space could be simplified to show each engineer only the details they need to see. [Cera et al., 2004] in a collaborative 3D assembly design environment, where multiple users work simultaneously over the network, and presents a combination of multiresolution geometry and multi-level information security models. Among various issues in IA, access-control is critical for the purpose. We demonstrate the specification of access privileges to geometric partitions in 3D assembly models defined based on the Bell-La Padula model. In our method, the partitioning is used to create variable level-of-detail (LOD) meshes, across both individual parts and assemblies, to provide a Role-based View suitable for a user with a given level of security clearance. We achieve these functional capabilities within a system designed for secure, realtime collaborative viewing of 3D models by multiple users working synchronously over the internet on standard graphics workstations.
This paper develops a new technique for Role-based Viewing
Aside from digital 3D watermarking, research on how to provide IA to distributed engineering teams, working in collaborative graphical environments, remains a novel and relatively unexplored area. The authors believe that this work represents a unique application of multiresolution surfaces to multi-level information security in computer-aided design and collaborative engineering. The specific contributions of this work include:
Provide a geometric approach to Information Assurance: Our work augments currently practiced accesscontrol techniques in collaborative CAD and PDM systems. Although most of these systems offer access-control facilities, they are often limited to prohibiting access to models and documents and not partitions of geometry.
Develop alternatives to the problem of "all-or-nothing" permissions: The standard method for handling a lack of appropriate permissions is suppression of the sensitive features. This work attempts to highlight some alternatives other than the traditional solution.
Outline the relation between Multi-level Security Hierarchies and Multiresolution Surfaces: We revisit the problem of Role-based Viewing in an updated context using role hierarchies. A hierarchy is represented as a weighted directed acyclic graph (DAG), where the permission discovery process is formalized as a graph reachability problem and the path cost is used as input to a multiresolution function.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes related work from information assurance, collaborative design, and computer graphics communities. Section 3 reviews the specification of security features in the fields of solid modeling and engineering as outlined in Reference and presents Hierarchical Role-based Viewing. Section 4 explains the details of our multiresolution security model and outlines its relation to the Role Hierarchy. Section 5 describes the implementation of our prototype system, and demonstrates a sample scenario using our approach. Lastly, Section 7 summarizes our results, presents our conclusions, and outlines goals for future research.
Related Work
The contributions presented in this paper are related to information assurance, collaborative design, and multiresolution surface generation.
Information Assurance and Security
Current research on information assurance incorporates a broad range of areas focused on protecting information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, confidentiality, nonrepudiation, authentication, and controlling modes of access. Information assurance research, in the context of the CAD domain, has been partially addressed by the computer graphics community through the development of 3D digital watermarking [Praun et al., 1999] . Digital Watermarking is used to ensure that the integrity of a model has been maintained, as well as provide a foundation for proof of copyright infringement. Other areas of research have been in authentication and access-control. We will introduce past and present research on access control methodologies and outline the differences between the varying policies.
There is a clear distinction between authentication and access control services. Authentication services are used to correctly determine the identity of a user. Access control is the process of limiting access to resources of a system only to authorized users, programs, processes, or other systems. Authentication is closely coupled with access control, where access control assumes that users of an information system have properly been identified by the system. If the authentication mechanism of a system has been compromised, then the access control mechanism that follows will certainly be compromised. The primary focus of our work is to articulate an access control policy, specifically for the geometry of a solid model, assuming a robust authentication mechanism has already been established. Access-control literature describes high-level policies on how accesses are controlled, as well as low-level mechanisms that implement those policies.
The common access control policies found in literature are Discretionary, Lattice-Based, and Mandatory Access Control (DAC, LBAC, and MAC respectively). DAC was formally introduced by Lampson [Lampson, 1971] , where essentially the owner of an object has discretion over what users were authorized to access that object. Access broadly refers to a particular mode of operation such as read or write. The owner is typically designated as the creator of an object, hence it is an actual user of the system. This is different from LBAC and MAC, which we will refer to collectively as MAC [Lampson, 1971] , where individual users have no discretion over object access. MAC [Bell and La-Padula, 1973 ] is primarily concerned with the flow of information, thereby enforcing restrictions on the direction of communication channels. For further discussion on access control policies, we refer interested readers to a survey by Sandhu [Sandhu and Samarati, 1994] .
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is an emerging area of study, and is actively pursued as an augmentation of traditional DAC and MAC. RBAC is an instance of a Multi-Level Security (MLS) framework, which is still an actively pursued area in the database community [Jajodia and Sandhu, 1991, Sandhu and Chen, 1998 ]. In RBAC, individual users are assigned roles, and the access permissions of an object are also assigned to roles. Therefore the permissions assigned to a role are acquired by the members associated with it. This additional layer reduces the management of permissions and supports the concepts of least privilege, separation of duties, and data abstraction. RBAC, and its associated components, are an instrument for expressing a policy, and not a policy by itself. For role-based viewing, we use a MAC policy embodied within an RBAC framework.
Collaborative Design
There is a vast body of past work on concurrent engineering and collaborative design. In our view, this research can be [loosely] grouped into two categories which we will call "data centric" and "interaction centric."
Data centric research focuses on collaborative data sharing or knowledge sharing. Historically, research of this kind emerged simultaneously from the engineering, the artificial intelligence, and database communities. Interaction centric approaches deal with the real-time or asynchronous collaboration among people in the design process. This most frequently means real-time, collaborative, multi-user environments. Often these environments would be graphical, or 3D; in other cases, the environment consist of computer-supported cooperative work (CSCW) tools coupled with design systems. Much of the recent work in Collaborative Graphics falls into the latter category.
The subset of existing work most relevant to our efforts is interaction centric, dealing with real-time 3D collaboration and communication. Distributed Virtual Environments (DVEs) [Jayaram et al., 1999 , Eriksson, 1994 , Macedonia et al., 1994 have been developed for real-time interactions between distributed collaborators in a number of different domains. Immersive environments such as CAVEs [Cruz-Neira et al., 1993] have been developed which also support real-time interaction, but they do not necessarily support collaborative CAD. [Conner et al., 1997] directly addressed the use of distributed VR for collaborative design, but in this work the design data was largely static and not worked on synchronously by multiple users. In each of these cases, the work employed large-scale virtual reality systems.
On the scale team design, where individual users collaborate using more typical computing hardware, empirical study is recently beginning to emerge. SHASTRA is an environment for collaborative visualization and shared multimedia, demonstrated mostly for scientific and medical applications [Anupam and Bajaj, 1993] . The DOME [Pahng et al., 1998 , Abrahamson et al., 2000 and FIPER [Rohl et al., 2000 , Kao et al., 2003 ] systems target the integration of software products, and coordination between them over the network, for collaboration among individuals assigned disjoint duties in the product development cycle or across institutional boundaries. These systems support an accesscontrol framework, but do not offer alternatives to the problem of "all-or-nothing" feature suppression when a lack of full permissions exists.
Research efforts on level of detail (LOD) rendering [Hoppe, 1998 ], view-dependent rendering [De Floriani et al., 2000] and 3D compression [Deering, 1995 , Taubin and Rossignac, 1998 , Gueziec et al., 1999 often mention the applicability of these techniques to collaborative design. To date, however, the main use of these efforts has been limited to areas such as streaming or transmitting 3D data over the Internet.
Multiresolution Techniques
Polygon meshes lend themselves to fast rendering algorithms, which are hardware-accelerated in most platforms. Many applications, including CAD, require highly detailed models to maintain a convincing level of realism. It is often necessary to provide LOD techniques in order to deliver real-time computer graphics and animations. Therefore, mesh simplification is adopted for efficient rendering, transmission, and various computations. The most common use of mesh simplification is to generate multiresolution models or various levels of detail (LOD). For example, closer objects are rendered with a higher LOD, and distant objects with a lower LOD. Thanks to LOD management, many applications such as CAD visualization can accelerate rendering and increase interactivity. A recent survey on mesh simplification can be found in Reference [Luebke, 2001] .
The most popular polygon-reduction technique is an edge collapse or simply ecol (more generally, vertex merging or vertex pair contraction) where two vertices are collapsed into a single one. The issues in ecol include which vertices to merge in what order, where to place the resulting vertex, etc. Vertex split or simply vsplit is the inverse operation of ecol. These operations are illustrated in Figure 1 (a) and a sequence of operations is illustrated on a sample model given in Figure 1 Hoppe proposed progressive mesh (PM) [Hoppe, 1996] , which consists of a coarse base mesh (created by a sequence of ecol operations) and a sequence of vsplit operations. Applying a subset of vsplit operations to the base mesh creates an intermediate simplification. The vsplit and ecol operations are known to be fast enough to apply at runtime, therefore supporting dynamic simplification.
Role-based Viewing
In the context of 3D design, a model M is a description of an artifact, usually an individual part or assembly, in the form of a solid model. A true collaborative engineering environment enables multiple engineers to simultaneously work with M. The engineers (designers, process engineers, etc) correspond to a set of actors A = {a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n }, each of which has associated with it a set of roles. Roles, R = {r 0 , r 1 , . . . , r m }, define access and interaction rights for the actors. For example, actor a 3 might have associated with it roles r 20 , r 23 , and r 75 -this entitles them to view (and perhaps change) portions of M associated with these roles. Portions of M not associated with these roles, however, might be "off limits" to actor a 3 . This section will build on the results of Reference [Cera et al., 2004] , where Role-based Viewing was developed in the context of distributed collaborative CAD, by introducing role hierarchies and their relation to multiresolution surfaces.
We formulate the problem of role-based viewing in the following subsections by developing:
• Actor-Role Framework: a general RBAC framework for describing actors and roles within a collaborative-distributed design environment. This framework uses a hierarchical graph to capture role-role relationships and create a relation between actors and roles.
• Model-Role Framework: an associative mapping from roles to topological regions on models. These regions capture the security features, F, of a 3D model-relating how a point, patch, part, or assembly can be viewed by actors with given roles.
• Hierarchical Role-Based Viewing: an algorithm to generate a role-based view given an actor a, his/her set of roles, the role hierarchy (RH), a model M, and its set of security features. A rolebased view is a tailored 3D model which is customized for actor a based on the roles defining a's access permissions on the model. In this way, the role-based view model does not compromise sensitive model information which a is not allowed to see (or see in detail). This is accomplished using a mesh simplification technique to generate the role-based view.
Actor-Role Security Framework
Our security framework is based on an adaptation of role-based access control, as developed in the information assurance and security literature [Sandhu et al., 1996] , to the collaborative design problem. We focus on the relation between actors, their roles and the solid model geometry. This is in contrast to other work on access control in collaborative CAD which has focused mainly on database synchronization/transaction issues [Bancilhon et al., 1985] .
Representing Actors and Roles
We define a hierarchical RBAC framework where:
1. Entities include a set of actors, A = {a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n } and a set of roles R = {r 0 , r 1 , . An example of this RBAC framework is given in Figure 2 . For the remainder of this paper, we focus on read permission granted by a given set of roles. Rather than "all or nothing" read permissions, our objective is to assign a "degree of visibility" to features of a model based on an actor's roles. Using this formulation, we show how one can implement a Bell-La Padula-based [Bell and La-Padula, 1973] security model for collaborative viewing of CAD data. compute the degree of visibility to each actor for a model assigned to a specific role. To implement the Bell-La Padula [Bell and La-Padula, 1973 ] model, we need to compute visibility in such a way as to guarantee that the role (e.g., security clearance) of someone receiving a piece of information must be at least as high as the role assigned to the information itself. In this way, a CAD model classified as "Secret" can only be viewed by those with a "Top-Secret" or "Secret" classification, but not viewed by someone with only a "Confidential" level of access. 
Model-Role Security Framework
Let M be a solid model of an artifact (part, assembly, etc.) 
Hierarchical Role-Based Viewing
The issue now is that, for a given actor a, what portions of the model M that he/she can see will depend on their associated roles and the security features of the model. Depending on their permissions, a new model, M , must be generated from M such that the security features are not shown or obfuscated based on the actor's roles. If their roles give them permission to see certain features (i.e., mating features), then the resulting model includes the features with the same fidelity as in M; if not, the features must be obfuscated in such a way as to hide from a what a does not have the right to see. Hence, the role-based view generation problem can be stated as follows:
Problem Given a set of roles and their relationships (R and RH); a solid model and its security features (M, F, and MR); and an actor (a and AR), determine the appropriate view M of model M for actor a.
We propose a solution based on the use of multiresolution meshes, as follows:
1. Convert solid model M to a high-fidelity mesh representation;
2. Based on F, determine which facets belong to each security feature, f ; 3. For each security feature f , do:
(a) If the intersection of actor a's roles and f 's roles is non-empty, then add the facets associated with f to M ; (b) If actor a's roles do not intersect the roles of f , determine (using RH) how much of f they are allowed to see and create a set of modified facets to represent f for inclusion in M .
4. Clean up the resulting M so that boundaries of the f i 's are topologically valid.
5. Return M .
There are three research problems we address:
1. How does the role-hierarchy RH relate to the degree of visibility? We show how the weighted DAG that comprises RH can be used to implement a number of useful security policies by making the model quality a function of the "path cost" among roles in RH.
How to modify the facets for each f i based on RH?
Our approach is to use a security policy (based on Bell-La Padula) associated with the role hierarchy RH to determine how to modify the model. In some cases, policy will dictate degradation of the model fidelity; in other cases, the security features may be completely deleted or replaced with a simple convex hull or bounding box as in Reference [Cera et al., 2004] . To accomplish this, we employ multiresolution meshes: model fidelity will be preserved to the degree the actor's rights allow it. The result is a mesh appropriate for viewing by the actor a.
3. How to ensure that the resulting regions form a topologically valid model? Deforming the model feature by feature may result in topological regions of facets in M that are mis-aligned or aesthetically unpleasing. Cracks and occlusion can be avoided by preserving the boundary edges during simplification.
Example. This example shows a model M whose surface is described by one security feature f 0 .
Given the role-hierarchy from Figure 3 , and four actors, a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , and a 3 with their AR shown in Figure 2 . Figure 5 shows the four different views of model M they each see. Given the AR, RH, and MR assignments, we can derive the direct actor × f eature mappings. Figure 6 gives the direct mappings specified implicitly by the AR, RH, and MR given in Figures 2(a) , 2(b), and 5 respectively. The two MR assignments that are not shown are f 1 ∈ r 1 and f 2 ∈ r 2 . It is important to note that, similar to inheritance found in most object-oriented programming languages, a 0 cannot see f 1 or f 2 even though it is the base role for sub-roles r 1 , r 2 , and r 3 . Hence an inheritance relation allows a child to inherit the permissions of the parent, but nothing is implied in the other direction. f 0 f 1 f 2 a 0 1.0 n/a n/a a 1 1.0 n/a n/a a 2 0.5 1.0 n/a a 3 0.25 0.5 1.0 
TECHNICAL APPROACH

Technical Approach
We combine techniques from solid modeling and computer graphics to provide a secure collaborative environment which supports real-time design. In this section we describe how to modify and configure Hierarchical RBAC to support our multiresolution security model. We describe the problems, algorithms employed, and final considerations.
Hierarchical RBAC Policy
Since RBAC is a means of articulating policy rather than a policy by itself, an actual policy is necessary. We wish to adopt a policy similar to the classical MAC model [Bell and La-Padula, 1973] . This is defined in terms of the following axioms using λ to return the security level of either an actor or a feature:
1. Simple Security Property -Actor a can read feature f iff λ (a) ≥ λ ( f ). This is also known as the read-down property.
2. Liberal * -Property Actor a can write feature f iff λ (a) ≤ λ ( f ). This is also known as the writeup property.
There are many variations of the * -property, but we will focus on the simple security property which essentially states that the clearance of a person receiving a piece of information must be at least as high as the classification of the object. Details on a formal construction of MAC in RBAC have been presented by Osborn [Osborn et al., 2000] .
Hierarchical RBAC is a natural means for structuring roles that reflect an organization's lines of authority and responsibility [Sandhu et al., 1996] . The main distinction between our approach and the generic RBAC frameworks found in literature, is that we also allow permissions to be modified through the role hierarchy. Typically permissions (i.e., an object and a permissible operation) are associated with every combination of ob ject × role. Since our read permissions are specified by a degree of visibility value, an inheritance relation can further refine this value. An inheritance relation is a binary relation (parent, child), where the child inherits permissions from the parent based upon a multiplicative weight w. For instance: w = 1.0 preserves the parents permissions exactly, while w = 0.5 will reduce the degree of visibility by half for all inherited objects. By transitivity, this weighted factor applies to all inherited objects specified in the role hierarchy.
Intuitively, it might appear that we're breaking the simple security property by allowing some actors to view objects that they normally would not be able to see. This is not the case, and instead should be viewed as transforming one object into a new object that is permissible. Hence, our model still adheres to the simple security property.
Given an actor (a) and a feature ( f ), the test to determine if a has permissions on f is equivalent to computing graph reachability among all possible pairs of roles assigned to both a and f . We will use R a to denote the set of roles assigned to a, and R f for the set of roles assigned to f . If any role in R a is reachable from any other role in R f (i.e., there exists a path), then the sum of all weights along the path yields the degree of visibility for that path. We will use a reachability function to return the set of all roles reachable from a given role. This may reveal several paths, hence the resultant degree of visibility for a will be chosen as the maximum. We denote the function that returns the maximum degree of visibility for a on f as α(a, f ). The result of this function can be computed once, stored, and re-used until an existing role assignment (AR or MR) is modified. The degree of visibility is then used as a parameter to another function, degradeResolution(a, f ), which degrades the fidelity of a feature depending on an actors permissions. 
α(Actor a, Feature f )
return f ; 6: end if
Generation of Multi-level Security Models
For part/component/assemblies with regions that need to be secured, multiresolution techniques are employed to provide various levels of detail. Although the original (highest) resolution version of a model might be a breach for some actors, lower resolution LODs will be sufficiently secure to transmit to those actors. In addition to purely geometric multiresolution techniques, Shyamsundar and Gadh have developed a framework for representing different levels of detail for geometric feature data Gadh, 2001, Shyamsundar and Gadh, 2002] . Our security model could be used in conjunction with this feature LOD representation, but an automatic simplification algorithm needs to be developed.
Mesh simplification techniques include either vertex decimation, vertex clustering, or edge contraction. Choosing a specific simplification technique among the breadth of candidates is application dependent. To address the demands of an interactive collaborative design environment, we outline several issues which are critical for simplification:
1. speed: As the number of component/assemblies in a session increases, the simplification becomes the bottleneck. We need an algorithm capable of drastic simplification in the least amount of time.
2. dynamic: Dynamic simplification provides a continuous spectrum of detail so an appropriate model can be selected at runtime. We do not wish to store all possible LODs within the model repository. Therefore a dynamic simplification will be ideal.
topology preserving:
To produce the most realistic simplification the original model's topology should be preserved. In addition, progressive meshes [Hoppe, 1996] are incompatible with topology modifying simplification and this technique will be useful for network transmission in a multiuser environment.
boundary preserving:
The boundary of objects should be preserved in order to distinguish objects from one another. Inadvertent occlusion and cracks may result if we relieve this constraint.
view-independence:
The viewer receives 3D model information therefore the simplification should also support this.
Given our requirements, Quadric Error Metrics [Garland and Heckbert, 1997] (QEM) is an obvious candidate. QEM provides drastic simplification, capable of progressivity, in a reasonably small amount of time. This algorithm also produces a result that is realistic and recognizable as a simplified variant of the original model. One issue is the algorithms dependence upon a threshold value. In the rare case that the threshold value is as large as the model itself, then the algorithm runs in O(n 2 ). An alternative approach is to compute an optimal threshold adaptively [Erikson and Manocha, 1999] .
We have proposed using an automatic simplification technique to degrade the fidelity of a model enough to satisfy the access-control requirements of a collaborative design session. An automatic technique cannot be proven to sufficiently degrade the model enough to be secure in all environments. The process can be supplemented by adopting a form of user-guided simplification [Li and Watson, 2001, Kho and Garland, 2003 ]. User-guided simplification is a means of supervising the simplification by editing the order of ecol performed during simplification, selecting regions where more or less simplification is necessary, or directly manipulating the vertex hierarchy. A side effect is that these simplification parameters need to be stored with the model, since these cannot be automatically derived.
QEM simplification can be configured to either maintain or modify the topological genus of a model. In a multi-user CAD server, progressive meshes (PM) [Hoppe, 1996] can be useful for the transmission of CAD models. If PM is used, and if the removal of holes yields a more secure version of a particular model, then genus-reduction techniques must be employed since standard PM is not compatible with topology-modifying simplification.
Cracks and occlusion must be avoided for continuous and adjacent regions of a part that are simplified independently. If a single part is partitioned into two or more regions, and each region has a different model-role assignment, then the regions will be simplified at different levels of detail. If boundary edges of the mesh are not preserved, then possibly cracks and self-occlusion will result. As a simple example, Figure 7 (a) gives an example of a gear tooth that has a different model-role assignment than the rest of the gear. If this tooth is simplified without preserving boundary edges, then, as in Figure 7 (b), cracks occur between the regions and self-occlusion results. 
Realization of Approach
The FACADE system is a multi-purpose CAD framework that supports numerous modes of functionality implemented as modules. Its most basic component is a 3D model viewer that supports standard camera navigation operations and the ability to view models using different shading algorithms or as a wireframe. FACADE's design allows instances of the system to be compiled with or without a particular module. The first module is a light design module which enables several basic tasks such as: selection of a part, component, assembly, or other selectable entity; applying affine transformations on a part; adding an alpha channel to a part for transparency; decomposing a part into multiple parts; specifying a set of parts as an assembly; manipulating control points on parametric surfaces (eg. bezier patches, splines, and NURBS). This subsystem is a prerequisite for most of the remaining modules described below.
The next module provides a semantic authoring interface as developed in Reference [Kopena et al., 2004] . This interface allows a designer to specify the function of parts, components, and assemblies, as well as the flow of inputs/outputs from one function to another. The module first makes a query, over the network, to the OwlJessKB reasoner asking for the ontological elements that it can use for the authoring of the function and flow semantics. After annotation is complete, the module provides the ability to save the semantic feature description to an OWL file which will be used during subsequent steps in the conceptual design phase.
The next module, which is at the focus of this paper, is the security authoring interface. This module provides an interface which allows a designer to assign role-based viewing parameters to a part, component, assembly, or semantic features that can be saved and later re-loaded. The designing stage allows a designer to assign a {label, permission}-tuple to parts, assemblies, or individual facets. The normalized permissions [0.0 − 1.0] were used to indicate a percentage of the features to be suppressed from the original model. In situations where the result is not sufficiently secure, a supervised technique, such as user-guided simplification can be used.
When a designer requests a model, they must first declare their identity so all direct role associations can be retrieved and implied associations, from RH, can be derived. Based upon the roles associated with a designer and the model features, a role-based view is generated. We used a single administrative account to modify permissions in the model repository. There are numerous administrative configurations which have been presented by Sandhu [Sandhu et al., 1999] . The goals and constraints of the collaboration will dictate how comprehensive the role administration requirements should be.
We have implemented our own topology-preserving QEM-based simplification algorithm. For the experiments in this paper, we chose to collapse only vertex pairs which are connected by an edge. The simplification algorithm is passed each tessellated and triangulated part, or connected region of a part with an equivalent {label, permission} set of tuples. Since these regions are disjoint, they can be simplified and transmitted in parallel.
The last module in FACADE enables the network client interface that can talk to a FACADE server. The server works in conjunction with the security module to provide role-based views to clients which do not have permissions to manipulate or view a model, or its semantic features, at full resolution. The server maintains consistency throughout all connected clients by sending rejection messages to clients when a design operation they have performed conflicts with the operation of another client. The server supports both "thin" and "fat" FACADE network clients and their corresponding protocols. The thin clients understand the Remote Frame Buffer (RFB) protocol [Richardson and Wood, 1998 ]. The fat clients understand an unpublished text-based protocol which sends only design transformation information after the initial model is sent.
The FACADE framework has been designed for maximum portability across all platforms. It has been tested and simultaneously developed in Solaris/SunOS (Sun CC/GNU g++), Linux (GNU g++), and Windows 2000 (Microsoft Visual C++) operating systems. It is implemented in C++ using OpenGL as the graphics rendering library. An OpenGL canvas can be displayed using either GLUT or Java via the JNI interface. The network socket libraries use BSD-style sockets under Unix-based derivatives and Winsock2 under Windows. The multi-threaded code uses POSIX threads (pthreads) under Unix-based derivatives and Windows Threads under Windows.
Example: Computer Mouse Assembly
We show how role hierarchies can be used to instantiate a multi-level information security model on an electro-mechanical assembly. Unlike previous work in role-based viewing [Cera et al., 2004] , this example demonstrates how the weighted role hierarchy affects the collaboration space. We present this as a more flexible and practical approach since role hierarchies naturally reflect an organization's line of authority and responsibility.
In the following example scenario, six actors are granted permission to view and modify a mouse assembly at some level of abstraction. Each actor is assigned a label and assigned a role from the role hierarchy. The set of actors is partitioned into three groups based on the nature of the design work: electrical, mechanical, and ergonomic. Individual parts, regions of parts, or other feature information are assigned labels and grouped into one of the hierarchies. These labels and descriptions are given in Figure 8 . Each of the lead engineers will be given full permissions to their respective subsystems. They are each given a subordinate, or observer, who is in training for this design. The sub-roles created for this purpose will be called observer roles. The engineers of one particular hierarchy will also need some level of viewing permissions to the other hierarchies, especially at the interface features. These roles will be called interface roles. The roles for the electrical, mechanical, and ergonomic hierarchies are given as r e , r m , and r s respectively. We'll use a second subscript to denote the role's position in the hierarchy where 0 is labeled as the lead roles, 1 is labeled as the observer roles, and 2 is for the interface roles. This actor-role assignment matrix is given in Figure 9 (a). The observer and interface roles are given less viewing privileges than the lead roles. The observer roles are given half the degree of visibility as the lead roles, and the interface roles are given half the degree of visibility as the as the observer roles. This weighted hierarchy is depicted in Figure 9 (b). Figure 9 (c) gives the complete set of model-role assignments for the mouse assembly. In this example, one clear advantage of the role hierarchy is that model-role assignments exist for only lead engineers and the subordinate roles inherit those permissions. Using α(a, f ), Figure 9( The r e hierarchy is assigned the electrical subsystem, the r m hierarchy is assigned the mechanical subsystem, and the r s hierarchy is assigned the shell. 25 .25 .25 .5 .5 .25 .25 a 5 .25 .25 .25 .5 .5 1 1 (d) Degree of visibility values for every actor × f eature computed using α(a, f ). These values can be derived from the AR, RH, and MR assignments given in Figures 9 (a), 9(b), and 9(c) respectively.
Label
Figure 9: All security associations and derived mappings for the mouse assembly example.
The supervisor (a s ) has unrestricted access to all features of the assembly. The supervisor's rolebased view is given in Figure 10 (a). Figure 10(b) shows the role-based view for the electrical engineer (a e,0 ) which shows the electrical features in full resolution, the mechanical features in a lower resolution, and the exterior features in an even lower resolution. Figure 10(c) gives the role-based view for the mechanical engineer where the mechanical features are displayed in full resolution, the electrical features in a lower resolution, and the exterior features in even lower detail. Figure 10 (d) depicts the ergonomics engineer's (r s,0 ) role-based view which depicts the interior and exterior in full resolution, but the remaining features are displayed in a low resolution. By using role-based views, designers need not be concerned with unnecessary design details and the protection of sensitive intellectual property can be maintained.
Conclusions and Future Work
This paper developed a new technique, Hierarchical Role-based Viewing, for multi-level information security in collaborative 3D assembly design. Role Hierarchies naturally reflect an organization's line of authority and responsibility. By incorporating security with collaborative design, the costs and risks incurred by multi-organizational collaboration can be reduced. Aside from digital 3D watermarking, research on how to provide security issues to distributed design, working in collaborative graphical environments, remains a novel and relatively unexplored area. The authors believe that this work is the first of its kind to bring multi-level security to geometric data in the field of computer-aided design and collaborative engineering.
Immediate future work involves using multiresolution techniques directly on the native surface types and examining network configurations to reduce aggregate bandwidth. We are currently extending these techniques to handle B-spline surfaces directly. The motivation for handling these surfaces is to demonstrate that for certain geometry, multiresolution surface techniques will provide a more intuitive simplification result. Crack prevention, permissions on patch boundaries when adjacent patches have different roles, and other issues will need to be addressed. We would also like to give a demonstration of the model on geometric, as well as semantic, feature data.
Our environment has been extended to support synchronous multi-user collaborative CAD. Optimal network configurations can be constructed and "grouping" of the mesh hierarchy can be performed for actors and assigned similar roles. We can take advantage of continuous LOD over a network using a progressive technique, such as Progressive Meshes [Hoppe, 1996] . This results in computing only one mesh hierarchy for an entire set of actors. For further optimization, multicast networks could be used to properly aggregate bandwidth when actors have similar privileges. 
